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1 Introduction
The move towards cleaner technologies has become one of the most important policy de-
bates in the recent years. International agreements like the Kyoto Protocol have certainly
influenced such a trend, along with the rising discussion on the broader concept of sus-
tainable development (see for example, Arrow et al., 2004). Among possible policy tools
to favor the switch to cleaner technologies (i.e. with lower polluting emissions), one can
distinguish between quotas and pollution permits (nicely studied by Bo¨hringer and Lange,
2005, for example), and fiscal policies. Fiscal policies include emission taxes designed to
limit the use of dirty technologies, investment subsidies in new and cleaner technologies,
and scrapping subsidies which favor the dismantlement of the oldest and most polluting
techniques. This paper is concerned with fiscal policies designed to promote the switch
to clean technologies, with a special emphasis on the energy market.
Indeed, a major component of the ongoing debate is about how to save energy consump-
tion, given that the latter is one of the most important sources of pollution. Whether a
substantial part of the gains in energy efficiency are due or not to Porter-like or induced-
innovation-like mechanisms is not the subject of this paper. Numerous papers have been
already devoted to this issue (see among others, Jaffe et al., 2002, and Jaffe and Stavins,
1995). We are more concerned about the effectiveness of the fiscal instruments outlined
above to effectively favor investment in the new and cleaner technologies, and about their
impact on GDP. Under a given pace for energy-saving technical progress, do investment
(in new capital goods) subsidies and/or scrappage subsidies have ultimately a positive
impact on investment and output? This question is far from obvious in a general equi-
librium framework where energy suppliers may also react to such policies. This paper
highlights the crucial role of the structure of the energy market in this respect.
To make things as realistic as possible, we shall consider a model with a vintage capital
structure, newer machines being less energy consuming. Beside realism, there are at least
three reasons to work on these models:
1. First of all, in such a setting technological progress is embodied in capital goods
so that switching to cleaner technologies amounts to investing in new machines,
implying that there is no need to distinguish between technology adoption and
investment. In short, investment subsidies can be roughly interpreted as technology
adoption subsidies without any additional specifications increasing the size of the
model.
2. Second, a nice property of this kind of models (see in particular, Boucekkine et
al., 1997 and 1998) is that an investment subsidy does also induce firms to shorten
the lifetime of operating capital goods, therefore inducing scrapping of the less
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profitable machines. Thus, within such a set-up, there is no need to distinguish
between investment subsidies and scrapping subsidies.
3. Last but not least, another sensitive property of this class of models connects the
optimal scrapping time with the cost (or price) of the production inputs. A machine
or technology is thrown out once its profitability drops to zero, and of course prof-
itability depends on the operation cost of the capital good involved (see the seminal
Solow et al., 1966, Malcomson, 1975, and again Boucekkine et al., 1997). Therefore,
the efficiency of investment subsidies should tightly depend on the price formation
of inputs, like energy, that is on the market structure of the associated inputs.
Few papers have been devoted to analyze the environmental questions outlined above
within a vintage structure, probably due to the mathematical sophistication implied by
this structure (compared to the homogenous capital structure). Among them, Xepa-
padeas and de Zeeuw (1999) used a model in which firms can invest in machines with
different characteristics, where newer machines are more productive and less polluting
but also more expensive than older machines. They found that a stricter environmental
policy cannot provide a win-win scheme in the spirit of the Porter hypothesis (Porter,
1991, Porter and van der Linde, 1995). Nevertheless, the trade-off between environmental
conditions and industry’s profits is less sharp than the situation without environmental
policy because of the modernization of the productive capacities (due to the increasing use
of less polluting and more productive machines) induced by such a policy. Feichtinger et
al. (2005a) (see also Feichtinger et al., 2005b and 2008) introduced a better specification
of embodied technological progress underlying the considered vintage capital structure.
They concluded that if learning costs are incorporated into the analysis (that’s running
new machines at their full productivity potential takes time), then the magnitude of the
modernization effect is strongly reduced, and environmental regulation has a markedly
negative effect on industry profits. Boucekkine et al. (2008) endogenized energy-saving
technological progress under emission quotas. They showed in particular that tighter
emission quotas are shown to not prevent firms to grow in the long-run, thanks to en-
dogenous innovation, but they have an inverse effect on the growth rate of profits.
In this paper, energy-saving technological progress is exogenously given as in the vast
majority of related vintage capital models, but the energy market structure is modelled
explicitly within a general equilibrium structure, in sharp contrast to the vintage models
quoted just above which investigate firms’ optimal control problems. To get useful ana-
lytical results, we build on the Leontief vintage capital model popularized by Solow et al.
(1966) with complementary inputs, energy and capital. In this framework, we analyze how
investment subsidies impact equilibrium investment and output depending on the energy
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market structure. In the environmental literature, the role of subsidies was analyzed in
several studies. Based on US data regarding the adoption of thermal insulation technol-
ogy in new home construction, Jaffe and Stavins (1995) found that technology adoption
subsidies have positive effect on the energy efficiency of new homes. This result was also
outlined by Hassett and Metcalf (1995) in an empirical study on residential conservation
investment where they found that energy tax credits have an important positive effect on
the probability of investing in energy-efficient capital. Anderson and Newell (2004) ob-
served that US manufacturing plants are more responsive to implementation costs than to
annual energy savings in their technology adoption decisions. This implies that subsidies
may be more effective at promoting energy-efficiency technologies than energy taxes. De
Groot et al. (2001) also observed for a survey of Dutch firms that cost savings are the
most important driving force for investing in energy-saving technologies, which suggests
an effective role of policy measures like subsidies and fiscal arrangements in promoting
for higher energy efficiency. Jung et al. (1996) provided a theoretical ranking of various
policy instruments promoting the development and adoption of advanced pollution abate-
ment technology. These results are similar than those of Milliman and Prince (1989) in
the case of identical firms.1
However, the possible adverse effect of subsidies was also pointed out. For example,
Verhoef and Nijkamp (2003) found in another heterogenous firms modeling that the pro-
motion of energy-efficiency enhancing technologies by means of subsidies may be counter-
productive because it could actually increase energy use. The authors also underlined
that using energy taxes may reduce the attractiveness of energy-saving technologies. De
Groot et al. (2002) suggested that investment subsidies for energy-saving technologies
can be also counter-productive as they may favor a lock-in into relatively inferior tech-
nologies. However, subsidies will become effective if the diffusion process of energy-saving
technology is slow in the absence of subsidies because in this situation subsidies increase
the number of adopters and the lock-in effect is avoided. Kemp (1997) found for the
case of the Netherlands that there was no significant effect of government subsidies on
the adoption of thermal insulation by households. Bjørner and Jensen (2002) found in
a panel of Danish industrial firms that subsidies in energy efficiency have no significant
effect on energy use. They also found that energy taxes are less effective than voluntary
agreements on energy use.
While the empirical studies provide such discrepant conclusions on the efficiency of invest-
ment subsidies in an energy-saving context, there is no paper -to our knowledge- tackling
theoretically this issue within the natural vintage setting outlined above. This paper is
1The role of investment subsidies was also summarized in the surveys of Jaffe et al. (2002, 2003) on
the relationship between technological change and the environment.
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an attempt to fill this gap while also incorporating the energy market structure into the
discussion. Several theoretical and empirical studies has already pointed out that the
market structure plays an important role on technology adoption. However, the issue is
conflicting as some argue that competition increases innovation while for some market
power may generate incentives to innovate and for the others the truth is in the middle
(Stoneman and Diederen, 1994). This observation may be summarized by the empirical
inverted U-shaped relationship between R&D intensity and market concentration (Levin
et al., 1985).
Concerning the energy market, the literature has recognized that its structure (external-
ities, barriers, market power, etc.) may explain the observed energy-efficiency gap or the
slow diffusion of energy-saving technologies and that public intervention is a necessary
condition for organizing the market and promoting energy efficiency (see, e.g., Jaffe and
Stavins 1994, Stoneman and Diederen 1994, Sutherland 1996, De Almeida 1998, Brown
2001, Jaffe et al. 2003, Kounetas and Tsekouras 2007). Recent restructuring and regu-
latory reforms have targeted the energy sector, particularly electricity, in the USA and
Europe hope to increase the competition in energy markets in order to achieve a higher
energy efficiency. In this paper, we consider two distinct structures of the energy sup-
ply sector: perfect competition with free entry and natural monopoly, where the energy
producer has different production technologies in each situation. Natural monopoly is a
plausible assumption as energy markets generates enormous fixed costs and economies of
scale. Water, electricity, and natural gas utilities are typically cited as examples of natural
monopolies. In fact, recent deregulation policies aim to encourage a competitive energy
generation sector, energy transmission and distribution remaining close to a regulated
monopoly situation (Joskow, 1997).2
The main result of this paper is that the impact of investment subsidies on equilibrium
investment and output heavily depend on the structure of the energy market, the mech-
anism explaining this outcome relying on the tight relationship between the lifetime of
capital goods and energy prices via the scrapping conditions inherent to vintage models,
as argued above. Indeed, increasing the investment subsidy rate does not only give rise
to the typical positive demand effect on investment, it will also launch a supply channel
mechanism relying on the scrapping mechanism outlined just above, and which effect on
investment depends on the market structure of the energy sector. Under a free entry
structure for the energy sector, the latter effect is positive, thus reinforcing the former
2It would be also interesting to consider the sector as a network industry with a vertical integrated
structure (production, transmission, and distribution) as underlined by, e.g., Tschirhart (1991) and
Joskow (1997). Such a modelling would be rather complex and we prefer to postpone it in a further
work.
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demand effect, and boosting investment. Under a natural monopoly structure for the
energy sector, the supply effect is negative, and can eventually offset the positive demand
effect, which is effectively arises under weak enough increasing returns in the production
technology in the energy sector.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the vintage model with energy-
saving technical progress, where we explicitly model the energy sector either as a natural
monopoly or a competitive firm with the free entry. Section 3 provides the balanced
growth path where all endogenous variables growth at the same constant rate. Section
4 discusses the impacts of investment subsidies on the economy. Section 5 concludes the
study.
2 A vintage capital model with energy-saving tech-
nical progress
Relying on Boucekkine et al. (1997), we build a decentralized vintage capital model
with energy-saving technological progress where the energy sector is either governed by
a natural monopoly or under free entry. This model has some salient characteristics.
First of all, the production function is linear in vintage capital, following the traditional
specification of Solow et al. (1966). Second, to guarantee the existence of a balanced
growth path (see Solow et al., 1966, for an illuminating assessment of this question), we will
assume that the successive vintages only differ in their (decreasing) energy requirement,
and not in their productivity. Thirdly, growth is exogenous. We start by a detailed
exposition of the structure of the model and its properties.
2.1 Individual’s behavior
Let us assume that the representative household solves a maximization problem with
nonlinear instantaneous utility function:
max
{c(t),a(t)}
∫ ∞
0
u[c(t)] e−ρt dt, (1)
subject to the budget constraint
a˙(t) = r(t)a(t)− c(t)− τ(t),
with initial wealth a0 given; c(t) and a(t) represent per capita consumption and per capita
asset holden by household respectively. The interest rate r(t) is taken as given by the
household. τ(t) is per-capita lump-sum taxes. In the model, investment subsidies are
entirely financed through this type of taxes. This is the simplest way to disentangle the
6
role of the latter subsidies. For simplification, we shall consider a logarithmic utility
function. This optimization problem is very standard, and the corresponding necessary
conditions are: c˙
c
= r(t)− ρ, with limt→∞ φ(t)a(t) = 0, where φ(t) is the co-state variable
associated with the wealth accumulation equation.3
2.2 Final good
The final good is produced competitively and the representative final firm solves the
following problem
max
{y(t)}
{
y(t)−
∫ 1
0
pj(t)yj(t) dj
}
(2)
where pj(t) is the market price of the intermediate input j, and the per-capita production
y(t) is given by a CES production technology
y(t) =
(∫ 1
0
yj(t)
²−1
² dj
) ²
1−²
(3)
defined over a continuum of inputs yj(t) with j ∈ [0, 1]. Prices are taken as given by
the representative final firm, and elasticity of substitution is such that ² > 1. As in the
standard monopolistic competition economy (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977), the corresponding
inverse demand function takes the form
pj(t) =
(
yj(t)
y(t)
)− 1
²
2.3 Input firm
We consider that the technological progress is embodied in the new capital goods acquired
by the firm. In any intermediate good sector, there exists a unique monopolistic firm,
which solves the problem:
max
{pj(t),yj(t),ιj(t),Tj(t)}
∫ ∞
0
[pj(t)yj(t)− pe(t)ej(t)− (1− sq(t))ij(t)]R(t) dt (4)
subject to
yj(t) = b
∫ t
t−Tj(t)
ij(z) dz (5)
ej(t) =
∫ t
t−Tj(t)
q(z)ij(z) dz (6)
pj(t) =
(
yj(t)
y(t)
)− 1
²
(7)
q(t) = e−γt (8)
3We shall abstract hereafter from the transversality conditions involved in the optimization work along
the paper, and assume convergence to well-defined balanced growth paths granted. More mathematical
literature about this specific issue can be found in Boucekkine et al. (1997, 1998).
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with initial conditions ij(t) given ∀ t < 0; pe(t), ej(t), and sq(t) denote energy price, energy
consumption and subsidies devoted to the purchase of new equipment respectively. Recall
that in this framework, technical progress is assumed to make machines (equipment) less
energy-consuming over time. Moreover, government subsidizes the acquisition of new
machines via sq(t) following from taxes τ(t). For all t ≥ 0, the tax variables and pe(t) are
taken as given by the monopolist. Parameter γ is strictly positive. The discount factor
R(t) takes the form:
R(t) = e−
∫ t
0 r(z) dz
Following Malcomson (1975), after changing the order of integration and applying some
algebra, the problem can be rewritten as
max
{yj(t),ij(t),Jj(t)}
∫ ∞
0
[
y(t)
1
² yj(t)
1− 1
² − λj(t)yj(t)− (1− sq(t))ij(t)
]
R(t) dt
+
∫ ∞
0
ij(t)
∫ t+Jj(t)
t
[bλj(z)− pe(z)q(t)]R(z) dz dt
+
∫ 0
−Tj(t)
ij(t)
∫ t+Jj(t)
0
[bλj(z)− pe(z)q(t)]R(z) dz dt
where λj(t) denotes the shadow value of yj(t) and Jj(t) = Tj(t + Jj(t)). Notice that
Tj(t) = Jj(t − Tj(t)). J(t) is the optimal life of machines of vintage t. The first order
conditions with respect to yj(t), ij(t) and Jj(t) are respectively, ∀ t ≥ 0:
λj(t) =
(
1− 1
²
)
pj(t)
R(t)(1− sq(t)) =
∫ t+Jj(t)
t
[bλj(z)− pe(z)q(t)]R(z) dz
bλj(t+ Jj(t)) = pe(t+ Jj(t)) q(t), ∀ t ≥ −Tj(0)
At the symmetric equilibrium, pj(t) = 1, yj(t) = y(t), ej(t) = e(t), Jj(t) = J(t), Tj(t) =
T (t), λj(t) = λ(t) and ij(t) = i. In that case, ∀ t ≥ 0:
λ(t) =
(
1− 1
²
)
≡ µ
R(t)(1− sq(t)) =
∫ t+J(t)
t
[
bµ− pe(z) e−γt
]
R(z) dz
bµ = pe(t) e
−γ(t−T (t))
where now q(t) = e−γt is explicitly replaced. Notice also that 0 < µ < 1, since ² > 1.
Notice that without imperfect competition, the shadow price λ(t) would be equal to 1.
The second equation gives the optimal investment rule equalizing the marginal cost of
acquiring one unit of (new) capital goods at t and the marginal benefit which amounts to
the actualized sum of net benefits over the expected lifetime of the acquired good (that
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is from t to t + J(t)). The last equation is the typical scrapping condition, mentioned
repeatedly in the introduction section, it corresponds to the optimality condition with
respect to J(t), and can be rewritten as:
pe(t) = b µ e
γ(t−T (t)).
This is the counterpart of the classical scrapping condition in Leontief vintage capital
models, with energy playing the role of labor in the early vintage models a` la Solow
et al. (1966) and imperfect competition (µ not equal to 1). The marginal value of
energy, the price pe(t) at the decentralized equilibrium, should be equal to the marginal
productivity of energy, here equal to b µ eγ(t−T (t)), where eγ(t−T (t)) is the inverse of the
energy requirement of the oldest vintage still in use at t. Therefore, as announced before,
the scrapping condition induced by our vintage structures does connect tightly energy
price with the optimal lifetime of machines. This connection is key in the main results
produced in this paper.
2.4 Energy sector
We assume that the market of energy sector has the following production function:
f(ht) =
(
h(t)
A(t)
)α
, (9)
where h(t) denotes the quantity of final goods devoted to energy production, and A(t) is
the marginal cost of energy production. Accordingly, to produce one unit of energy we
need A(t) units of final goods, which means that it is more and more costly to produce
energy. The profit of a firm in the energy sector is:
pi(t) = pe(t)f(h(t))− h(t) (10)
where we remind that pe(t) denotes the energy price. We shall distinguish two market
structures:
1. The natural monopoly: This is the case of decreasing average cost, typically
implied by the existence of fixed costs. This structure is obtained when setting
α > 1. Hereafter we refer to it as the NM structure.
2. Perfect competition: This is the case of increasing average cost and free entry
that is typically obtained under decreasing returns, α < 1. We refer to it as the FE
structure (FE for free entry).4
4We shall exclude the case α = 1 in our study, it will be crystal clear in the next section that a
balanced growth path cannot exist under this zero-measure parameterization.
9
In both cases, the pricing of energy will correspond to the zero profit condition:
pe(t) = h(t)
1−α A(t)α. (11)
While the condition is the same in both cases, it does not cover the same kind of equilib-
rium concept. In the perfect competition case, it’s simply the result of an underlying
assumption of free entry. In the natural monopoly case, it corresponds to the well-
known second-best Ramsey-Boiteux pricing (see, e.g., Sherman 1989, Carlton and Perloff
2005). This paper will show clearly that the economic implications of investment subsidies
strongly depend on the market structure considered for the energy sector.
2.5 Decentralized equilibrium
From previous sections, the equilibrium of this economy is characterized by the following
system, ∀ t ≥ 0:
c˙
c
= r − ρ (12)
y(t) = b
∫ t
t−T (t)
i(z) dz (13)
R(t)(1− sq(t)) =
∫ t+J(t)
t
[
bµ− pe(z) e−γt
]
R(z) dz (14)
bµ = pe(t) e
−γ(t−T (t)) (15)
f(h(t)) =
∫ t
t−T (t)
i(z) e−γz dz (16)
y(t) = i(t) + c(t) + h(t) + τ(t) (17)
J(t) = T (t+ J(t)) (18)
with initial conditions i(t), ∀ t ≤ 0 given. Equation (16) represents the equilibrium in the
energy market where here f(h(t)) denotes the energy supply and where the parameter γ
represents (Harrod neutral) technical progress. Equation (17) represents the equilibrium
in the goods market. All others equations were previously derived from agents’ problems.
Equations (12)-(18) allow us to solve the the endogenous variables y(t), c(t), r(t), i(t),
J(t), T (t) and pe(t) given the exogenous technological process.
3 Balanced growth path: definition and conditions
Let us define the environment for balanced growth path (BGP). We assume that at the
stationary equilibrium, c(t) = c eγt, pe(t) = pe e
γt, y(t) = y eγt, i(t) = i eγt. Accordingly,
we set τ(t) = τ eγt and A(t) = Aeγt, for the BGP to exist.
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Definition.- The BGP equilibrium is a situation where all endogenous variables growth
at the same constant rate γ except J(t) = T (t) = T .
We obtain:
r = γ + ρ (19)
y = c+ i+ h+ τ (20)
y = b
i
γ
(1− e−γT ) (21)
1− sq
bµ
=
∫ t+T
t
[
1− eγ(z−T ) e−γt] e−r(z−t) dz (22)
pe = bµ e
−γT (23)∫ t
t−T
i(z)e−γz dz =
(
h
A
)α
, and then iT =
(
h
A
)α
(24)
pe = h
1−α Aα (25)
Finally, setting u = z − t we can compute the stationary value for the scrapping age:
1− sq
bµ
=
∫ T
0
[
1− e−γ(T−u)] e−(γ+ρ)u du ≡ F (T, γ, ρ) (26)
which defines function F (T, γ, ρ). This integral function can also be rewritten as
F (T, γ, ρ) =
∫ T
0
∫ T
τ
γ exp{−ρz − γσ} dσ du (27)
Along the balanced growth path, the optimal investment rule simplifies to (26). In partic-
ular, F (T, γ, ρ) provides a measure of the marginal return from investment in the long run.
Using (27), we can derive the necessary and sufficient conditions for a balanced growth
path (defined above) to exist. Indeed, the stationary system above has a clear recursive
structure. Once T computed, all the other unknowns can be recovered immediately from
the system (19)-(24). For example, equilibrium energy price level can be recovered from
(23) given T , and once this price computed, one can use equation (25) to calculate the
long-term energy sector input h. And so on. The existence of a long run scrapping age
along a balanced growth path is settled in the next proposition.
Proposition 1 A balanced growth path exists if and only if ρ + γ < bµ
1−sq . If γ tends to
zero, T tends to infinity.
Proof. Proposition 1 states a necessary and sufficient condition for a unique long-run
(positive) scrapping value T to exist, that is such that F (T, .) = 1−sq
bµ
. Indeed, by (27),
F (T, .) is strictly increasing in T . It should be noticed that F (T, .) is the integral value of a
positive function for which the integration support increases with T . Since F (0, γ, ρ) = 0,
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a positive long run value for T exists if and only if limT→∞ F (T, .) >
1−sq
bµ
. This limit is
computed as:
lim
T→∞
(∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
z
γ e−ρz−γσ dσ du
)
=
1
ρ+ γ
which gives the parametric condition of the proposition. Notice that when γ tends to zero
(no energy-saving technological progress), the integrand appearing in (27) tends to zero,
and T should consequently be infinite for the optimal investment rule to hold. ¤
Consistently with Boucekkine et al. (1998), it is possible to say more about the scrapping
behavior in terms of the parameters of the problem, using equations (26) and (27).
Proposition 2 Assuming that conditions in Proposition 1 hold, the following properties
hold :
(i) T is a decreasing function of b, µ and sq. It is increasing in ρ.
(ii) T does not depend on the parameters of the energy sector production function,
f(h).
(iii) T is decreasing with respect to γ provided T is lower than 1
γ
.
Proof. The proof of (iii) is quite hard given the complicated nature of the integral
equation (26). We report its demonstration in the Appendix. The first properties are
trivial mathematically speaking.
The depicted properties are mostly easy to get and to understand economically. For
example, notice that an increase in b decreases the left hand side of (26). Hence, F (T, γ, ρ)
should decrease for the optimal investment rule to be still valid. As function F (.) is strictly
increasing in T , the scrapping age should go down to keep on moving on the balanced
growth path. In economic terms, this outcome is most intuitive. Indeed, an improvement
in the productivity of the machines makes it optimal to accelerate the scrapping of the
older ones. The same general argument applies to γ. However in our model, an increase
in γ raises the equilibrium interest rate by equation (19), which diminishes the marginal
return from investing. As in Boucekkine et al. (1998), and more recently in Boucekkine et
al. (2008), this negative effect is more than compensated by the positive one as long as the
interest burden is bounded over the lifetime of machines, for example when γT ≤ 1 (see the
Appendix). Hereafter, we shall assume that we are only considering the parameterizations
such that the latter property holds.5
Concerning the subsidy variable, the outcomes are rather clear and intuitive as far as
scrapping is concerned. For example, an increase in the investment subsidy decreases the
5Notice that this is the realistic case. For γ around 2.5% per year, we restrict T to be lower than 40
years, which covers by far the typical figures.
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marginal cost of acquiring new machines, which accelerates scrapping and boosts new
investment. More intriguingly, notice that since equation (26) does not depend neither on
the energy production function f(h), the long-term optimal scrapping will neither. Indeed
as one can see from (24), a change in f(h) affects the optimal level of investment but not
its lifetime. This is a sensitive property of the model, and we shall use it intensively later
on.
The following proposition shows up some properties of energy production function h and
energy price pe.
Proposition 3 Assuming that conditions in Proposition 2 hold, the following properties
hold :
(i) pe = pe(γ, b, sq, µ) decreases with γ, but increases with b, sq and µ.
(ii) Under the NM structure, h = h(γ, b, sq, µ, A) has the opposite comparative statics
of the energy price pe, it is increasing in A.
(iii) Under the FE structure, h = h(γ, b, sq, µ, A) has the same comparative statics
as the energy price pe, it is decreasing in A.
Proof. The proof is trivial. Using (23) and Proposition 2, one gets immediately that pe
is increasing in b and µ directly and via the scrapping variable T which goes down when
each of these parameters increases. More straightforwardly, pe is an increasing function of
the scrapping rate sq exclusively via the scrapping variable. The effect of a technological
acceleration through the rate γ on pe is much harder to disentangle since pe is proportional
to e−γT in the long-run, and the scrapping time is shortened when γ is raised. The Lemma
in the appendix solves the problem. Actually, the product γT is an increasing function of
γ, or in other terms T is less than a linear function of γ. This establishes the properties
(i) of the Proposition.
Properties (ii) and (iii) are obvious consequences of (i) and the relationship depicted in
equation (25), that’s:
pe = h
1−α Aα,
or
h = p
1
1−α
e A
α
α−1 .
From now we will focus on the impact of investment subsidies sq on investment and
output.
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4 The impact of investment subsidies on investment
and output
In this section, we study the effects of subsidies on investment and the output-maximizing
subsidies.
4.1 Impact of subsidies on investment level
Let us start with investment response to an increment in the subsidy rate sq. From (24),
one gets:
i =
1
T
(
h
A
)α
.
Notice that an increase in sq has a priori an ambiguous effect on investment. On one
hand, it shortens scrapping (Proposition 2), inducing a more intense investment effort
(demand effect), but one the other hand, it also affects investment in the energy sector
(variable h) and therefore the energy supply (supply effect). By Proposition 3, we know
that such an effect dramatically depend on the market structure of the energy sector.
It follows that the overall effect of larger investment subsidies on the investment level is
unclear and mainly depends on whether the energy market is under FE or NM structures.
We can go a step further and bring an analytical solution to the ambiguity problem stated
just above. One can use equations (23) and (25) to write i as a function of T . One gets:
i = (bµ)
α
1−α A
α
α−1
e
αγT
α−1
T
. (28)
We shall denote by Θ(T ) the function: Θ(T ) = e
αγT
α−1
T
. Under the structure FE, that
is when α < 1, function Θ(T ) is decreasing as the product of two positive decreasing
functions. Therefore, i investment is boosted by investment subsidies in such a situation
since they lower equipment lifetime. Actually, using our interpretation just above, a
larger subsidy will yield both positive demand and supply effect in such a case: not
only investment is boosted by the typical demand effect inherent to vintage models, it
is also stimulated by the rise of energy supply (as depicted in Proposition 3, property
iii). Things are much more complicated in the NM case where the latter supply effect
becomes negative and can offset the positive demand effect. We show hereafter that the
result depends on the strength of the natural monopoly in a very concrete sense.
To clarify the latter concept, let us start with some trivial algebra. Clearly, the impact
of subsidies depends algebraically on the properties of functions Θ(T ). Differentiating it
yields:
Θ′(T ) =
e
αγT
α−1
T 2
[
αγT
α− 1 − 1
]
.
14
Suppose α > 1 and γT < 1. Recall that the latter condition is sufficient to guarantee
the realism of the model, and in particular that T is decreasing under technological ac-
celerations. The main trick which allows to be conclusive is the observation that T is
independent of α (property (ii) of Proposition 2). Therefore, one can “play” on α without
affecting the long-run equilibrium value of T . Since α
α−1 is a strictly decreasing function
of α, the outcome is clear. For α > α0 = 1
1−γT , Θ
′(T ) < 0, and investment, being a de-
creasing function of scrapping, is boosted by subsidies. In such a case, the NM structure
yields the same prediction as the FE structure. However, when 1 < α < α0 = 1
1−γT ,
Θ′(T ) > 0, and investment gets depressed by subsidies! Therefore, under the NM struc-
ture, investment is stimulated by subsidies if and only if the natural monopoly is strong
enough in the sense that returns to the production function in the energy sector are large
enough (or equivalently, if and only if the average cost in the energy sector is decreasing
rapidly enough). Below the α-threshold value, α0, the reverse happens. We summarize
the results in the following proposition:
Proposition 4 Assuming that conditions in Proposition 1 hold, and provided γT < 1,
the following properties hold :
(i) Under the FE structure, an increase in the investment subsidy sq raises the
investment level in the long-run.
(ii) Under the NM structure, an increase in investment subsidy stimulates long-run
investment if and only if returns to the production function in the energy sector are large
enough, i.e. if and only if α > α0 = 1
1−γT . Otherwise, either investment is depressed
(1 < α < α0 = 1
1−γT ) or insensitive to fiscal stimulus (α = α
0 = 1
1−γT ).
Henceforth, our model shows clearly that the market structure of the energy sector does
matter as to the efficiency of investment subsidy. The interpretation of the previous
proposition is quite neat. As mentioned above, raising the investment subsidy rate sq has
a positive demand effect on investment and a supply effect which effect on investment
depends on the market structure of the energy sector. Under an FE structure for the
energy sector, the latter effect is positive, thus reinforcing the former demand effect, and
boosting investment. Under an NM structure for the energy sector, the supply effect is
negative, and can eventually offset the positive demand effect. Proposition 4 shows that
this happens under weak enough increasing returns in the production technology in the
energy sector. In such a case, one gets the paradoxical property that investment subsidies
do lower investment level!
Thus, in general one can see that an increase in investment subsidies generally
triggers a higher diffusion of energy-saving technologies as new capital embodies energy-
saving technological change. Results described in Proposition 4 seem therefore rather
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consistent with the viewpoint of Stoneman and David (1986). Although they considered
a quite different set-up (since they are more concerned with general technologies), they
concluded that adoption subsidies always increase the use of new technologies, either
when the supply market is under perfect competition or is under a monopoly. We get the
same kind of results in our framework with a notable exception: under natural monopoly,
diffusion of cleaner technologies is not fastened by subsidies if the returns to scale of the
monopoly’s technology are not large enough. This new result points at an intermediate
energy market configuration which is definitely bad for clean technology diffusion, and
therefore “moderate” in a way Stoneman and David’s statement, which is certainly more
in line with the very contrasted related empirical evidence.
How does this affect output response? Before getting to the algebraic developments, a
few comments are in order. By construction, the production function of the final good
(which is used for consumption, investment and production of energy) is a vintage capital
Leontief technology. It depends on two ingredients: investment and lifetime of machines.
The larger investment and the longer the lifetime of machines, the larger output. When
the investment subsidy is raised, the lifetime of machines always drops, but not neces-
sarily investment. Under an FE structure in the energy sector, investment does increase,
and it is also the case under an NM structure with large enough increasing returns. In
these two cases, the overall impact of rising investment subsidies is ambiguous and will
be tackled in the next section when searching for output-maximizing subsidies. Note
however that if we retain an NM configuration with low enough increasing returns, the
overall effect of subsidies on output is already clear: both the lifetime of machines and
investment drop, which unambiguously and markedly depresses output. Henceforth, the
latter case is clearly identified as the case against investment subsidies. Let us summarize
this property in the following proposition before getting to output-maximizing subsidies.
Proposition 5 Assuming that conditions in Proposition 1 hold, and provided γT < 1,
long-run output level declines in response to rising investment subsidies under the NM
structure for the energy sector with low enough increasing returns.
4.2 Output-maximizing subsidies
Using equations (21) and (28), one can readily express detrended output y as a function
of T , precisely:
y = Ψ
e
αγT
α−1
T
[
1− e−γT ] , (29)
where Ψ is a constant independent of sq, implying that the impact of investment subsidies
on y exclusively depends on the shape of its relationship with T . The first T -function,
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e
αγT
α−1
T
, comes from long-term investment level as given in equation (28). It is a decreasing
function of T , and notice that it goes to infinity when T goes to zero. The second T -
function, 1 − e−γT , measures directly the impact of capital lifetime on output: longer
lifetime implies larger output level (since firms will operate a wider range of machines).
Notice that this term goes to zero when T tends to infinity. How does output behave when
T tends to infinity given that the investment effect goes to infinity and the scrapping time
effect goes to zero? A trivial computation leads to the result that output will tend to a
constant Ψγ when T goes to zero. This happens when the subsidy rate sq tends to 1:
output is still defined in the limit and equal to a well-identified constant. Nonetheless, such
a situation violates the positivity of consumption level in the long-run. By equation (20),
since either y and h are finite when T goes to zero while i becomes infinite, consumption
must go to −∞. We shall therefore disregard this limit situation as economically relevant.
Let us dig deeper. Differentiating output as given by the previous equation with respect to
T , one ends up finding that the sign of the derivative depends on the sign of the following
difference:
e−γT
[
1− γT
α− 1
]
−
(
1− α
α− 1 γT
)
,
which is by no means trivial and depends, among others, on the position of α with respect
to 1. The following proposition states that there is no output-maximizing subsidy rate
in both remaining cases: α < 1 or α > α0, that is either under the FE or NM structures
provided the increasing returns are large enough in the latter configuration. Though there
is a clear trade-off involved in both cases (increasing investment but declining scrapping
time in response to rising investment subsidies), there is no interior subsidy rate maxi-
mizing output. Beside this property, the FE and NM structures produce opposite results:
While in the former, it is optimal to subsidize investment as much as possible, it is optimal
to not subsidize at all investment in the latter.
Proposition 6 Assuming that conditions in Proposition 1 hold, and provided γT < 1:
(i) Under the FE structure, long-run output is an increasing function of the subsidy
rate, sq.
(ii) Under the NM structure with large enough increasing returns, long-run output
is a decreasing function of the subsidy rate, sq. Provided consumption is positive when
sq = 0, the output-maximizing rate is precisely s
∗
q = 0.
Proof. The proof is a bit tricky, we report it in detail in the appendix. Three remarks are
in order here. First of all, the mechanisms underlying the properties highlighted just above
are clear. As mentioned above, under either an FE or NM structure (with large enough
increasing returns), rising the subsidy rate increases investment, which raises output, but
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lowers the lifetime of machines, which reduces output. Property i) above means that
under the FE configuration, the first effect always dominates. In the alternative case,
the opposite happens. Secondly, the proposition tends to confirm that the NM structure
for the energy sector eliminates the potential advantages of investment subsidies in terms
of output gains, whatever the extent of increasing returns in that sector. Thirdly, the
FE structure has exactly the opposite outcome: in this market configuration, the larger
the subsidy rate the better for output. In our model and particularly due to the Leontief
technology in the final good sector, there is however an upper limit to this rate, sq < s¯ ≤ 1,
for consumption level to remain positive. As we have explained above, when sq goes to
1, T goes to zero, and though output remains finite in the limit, investment explodes,
imposing an infinitely negative consumption level for the resource constraint (20) to be
fulfilled. We don’t go further here and won’t determine endogenously the upper-limit s¯,
the point is already very clear and does not need more tedious computations.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we develop a general equilibrium vintage capital model with energy saving-
technological progress, endogenous scrapping and an explicit energy market. Because of
the scrapping condition inherent to vintage capital models, the price of energy is tightly
connected with the (optimal) age structure of the operating capital stock. We show that
investment subsidies designed to fasten the diffusion of cleaner technologies may not al-
ways achieve this objective due a a well-identified general equilibrium effect. Such a result
is rather consistent with the highly conflicting related empirical reports. More specifically,
increasing investment subsidies do not only generate the typical positive demand effect
on investment, often pointed out in partial equilibrium studies, they also affect energy
supply and equilibrium energy price, which affects again investment via the scrapping
mechanism repeatedly advocated along this paper. Under a free entry structure for the
energy sector, the latter effect is positive, thus reinforcing the former demand effect, and
boosting investment. Under a natural monopoly structure for the energy sector, the sup-
ply effect is negative, and can eventually offset the positive demand effect, which does
happen when increasing returns in the production technology in the energy sector are
not strong enough. We get more results on the impact of investment subsidies on output
level.
Of course, the mechanisms and results identified in this paper deserve further empir-
ical and theoretical analysis. It goes without saying that our results are extracted under
linear production functions in the intermediate goods sector, and this linearity simplifies
our study to a certain extent. In particular, it allows to solve for the balanced growth
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paths following a straightforward recursive scheme. Such a scheme, in turns, has allowed
for a neat identification of the demand and supply effects described along the paper. We
are currently studying another version of the model with a more general production func-
tion in the intermediate goods sector, which breaks down partially the above-mentioned
recursivity, therefore only allowing for numerical analysis. Another useful complementary
study concerns the empirical testing of the theory developed in this paper, which requires
in particular an accurate appraisal of the characteristics of energy markets. This looks
like a daunting task but it is certainly a necessary step to take to understand the diffusion
factors of clean technologies.
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Appendix : Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2: As already mentioned, Properties (i) and (ii) are trivial. Let
us prove Property (iii). To this end, we need the following Lemma.
Lemma Assuming that conditions in Proposition 1 hold, the product γT is an increasing
function of γ.
Proof of Lemma. Observe that:
∂(γT )
∂γ
= T + γ
∂T
∂γ
= T − γ
∂F
∂γ
∂F
∂T
which implies
∂F
∂T
∂(γT )
∂γ
= T
∂F
∂T
− γ ∂F
∂γ
From relation (27), the function F can be rewritten as
F (T, γ, ρ) =
∫ T
0
e−ρz
(
e−γz − e−γT ) du
the required partial derivatives can be obtained after some algebraic operations:
T
∂F
∂T
− γ ∂F
∂γ
=
∫ T
0
γz e−(ρ+γ)zdu
which is positive. From Proposition 1, we know that ∂F
∂T
> 0, we deduce that γT is an
increasing function of γ. ¤
It is now possible to prove Property (iii) of Proposition 2. Consistently with Boucekkine
et al. (1998), we will show that a sufficient condition for T to decrease with γ is T ≤ 1
γ
.
The latter property is satisfied if ρ + γ < bµ
4(1−sq) . In fact, the total differentiation of the
equation F (T, γ, .) = 1 leads to
∂T
∂γ
= −
∂F
∂γ
∂F
∂T
As ∂F
∂T
> 0 (Proposition 1), T is a decreasing function of γ if and only if the partial
derivative of F with respect to γ is positive. Given that
∂F
∂γ
=
∫ T
0
∫ T
z
(1 + γ + σ) e−(ρz+γσ)dσ du
a sufficient condition for T to decrease when γ rises is the positivity of function 1−γσ on
the integration domain. This is checked if only if the line σ = 1
γ
is above the integration
domain. This is the case if T ≤ 1
γ
. Now, note that, using the integral function defined in
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(26), the condition T ≤ 1
γ
is equivalent to the inequality 1−sq
bµ
≤ F ( 1
γ
, .). Computing the
integration yields
1− sq
bµ
≤ e
−( γ+ρ
γ
) − 1
−(γ + ρ) −
e−(
γ+ρ
γ
) − e−1
−ρ
In terms of parameters’ expressions of Proposition 1, denote x = ρ+γ
b′ , with b
′ = 1−sq
bµ
.
Observe that x > γ′ ≡ γ
b′ . Elementary algebraic operations allow us to write the following
inequality
x2 +
(
e−1 − 1− γ′)x+ γ′ < γ′e− xγ
For any fixed γ′, one can find the values of x (x > γ′) such that the above inequality holds.
Note that this inequality is very easy to tabulate for function in x and γ′ on both sides.
In particular, the inequality holds for γ′ < x < 1
4
. Such a sufficient condition ensures
that T is decreasing with respect to γ and is consistent with parameterizations usually
adopted in empirical studies. ¤
Proof of Proposition 6: Recall that the sign of the derivative of output with respect
to scrapping time T is the sign of the difference
e−γT
[
1− γT
α− 1
]
−
(
1− α
α− 1 γT
)
,
which we may write ψ1(T )− ψ2(T ) with obvious notations.
Consider the case α < 1. We have to study both functions ψ1(T ) and ψ2(T ) for 0 ≤ T ≤ 1γ .
ψ2(T ) is an affine function increasing from 1 to
1
1−α . Differentiating ψ1(T ) one gets:
ψ′1(T ) = γ e
−γT α− γT
1− α .
Therefore, ψ(T ) is increasing on the interval [0 α
γ
], from ψ1(0) = ψ2(0) = 1 to ψ1
(
α
γ
)
,
then decreasing on the interval (α
γ
1
γ
]. On the other hand, one can readily prove that
ψ1(T ) is strictly concave on the whole interval [0
1
γ
]. Indeed:
ψ′′1(T ) = γ e
−γT
[
− 2γ
1− α +
γ2T
1− α
]
,
and since T ≤ 1
γ
, we get ψ′′1(T ) < 0 on the interval [0
1
γ
]. Notice now that ψ1(0) = ψ2(0) =
1 and that ψ′1(0) = ψ
′
2(0) =
αγ
1−α . Hence the two functions start at the same point at T = 0
and with the same slope (tangency). Since ψ1(T ) is strictly concave while ψ2(T ) is affine
increasing, it follows that the two functions can not intersect in the interval (0 α
γ
], and
ψ2(T ) > ψ1(T ) on this interval. This establishes the first part of Proposition 6.
Let us consider now the case α > α0 = 1
1−γT > 1. In such a case, ψ2(T ) is an affine
function decreasing from 1 to 1
1−α . The crucial thing with respect to the case α < 1 is
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that ψ1(T ) is now strictly decreasing and strictly convex on the interval [0
1
γ
]. It is enough
to have a look at the expressions of the first and second order derivatives of this function
displayed just above. Further given that ψ1(0) = ψ2(0) = 1 and that ψ
′
1(0) = ψ
′
2(0), the
two functions cannot intersect, and ψ2(T ) < ψ1(T ) on (0
1
γ
]. ¤
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